The Swedish welfare state: neo-liberal challenge and welfare state resilience by Bergqvist, Christina & Lindbom, Anders
www.ssoar.info
The Swedish welfare state: neo-liberal challenge
and welfare state resilience
Bergqvist, Christina; Lindbom, Anders
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Zeitschriftenartikel / journal article
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Bergqvist, C., & Lindbom, A. (2003). The Swedish welfare state: neo-liberal challenge and welfare state resilience.
Österreichische Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft, 32(4), 389-401. https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-
ssoar-60407
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer CC BY-NC Lizenz (Namensnennung-
Nicht-kommerziell) zur Verfügung gestellt. Nähere Auskünfte zu
den CC-Lizenzen finden Sie hier:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/deed.de
Terms of use:
This document is made available under a CC BY-NC Licence
(Attribution-NonCommercial). For more Information see:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0
389ÖZP, 32 (2003) 4
Christina Bergqvist (Uppsala) / Anders Lindbom
(Uppsala)
The Swedish Welfare State: Neo-liberal
Challenge and Welfare State Resilience
Angesichts neo-liberaler Strömungen und schwerer wirtschaftlicher Probleme während der frühen
1990er Jahre befürchteten viele Beobachter, der schwedische Wohlfahrtsstaat würde sein umfassendes
und geschlechter-gerechtes Profil verlieren. Dieser Beitrag argumentiert, dass die Veränderungen
des schwedischen Wohlfahrtsstaates in den 1990er Jahren inkrementell, aber nicht fundamental waren.
Tatsächlich wurden Kürzungen und Änderungen vorgenommen, diese resultieren allerdings nicht in
einer radikalen Restrukturierung des Wohlfahrtsstaates. Die zentralen Sozialleistungen wurden
universalistischer, nicht zuletzt dank des steigenden Anteils von Frauen am Arbeitsmarkt. Auch die
öffentliche Kinderbetreuung wurde eher ausgedehnt denn eingeschränkt. Dies belegt, dass es nach
wie vor Spielraum für Politikdivergenz gibt. Selbst einer kleinen offenen Wirtschaft mit dem höchsten
Budgetdefizit innerhalb der OECD in den 1990er Jahren war es möglich, das nationale Budget wieder
unter Kontrolle zu bringen, ohne den Wohlfahrtsstaat abzubauen.
1. Introduction
Neo-liberalism has posed a serious challenge
to the welfare state for over two decades. Neo-
liberal ideology argues that the high taxes that
generous welfare programs require distort the
function of markets by creating a tax-wedge that
stops numerous transactions and therefore re-
duces economic growth. Irrespective of the eco-
nomic consequences, neo-liberals also argue that
high taxes and welfare programs reduce the free-
dom of individuals to pursue their life-projects,
i.e. that they are paternalistic. Concerning gen-
der equality and the relationship between the
state, market and family Swedish neo-liberals
have claimed that public authorities have taken
over too much of the parents responsibilities.
They argue that parents (read mothers) do not
have the choice to stay at home. Their ambition
has been to privatise social services like
childcare either to the family or to the market.
How then has neo-liberalism affected Swedish
welfare state development over the last couple
of decades? Has there been a shift in the rela-
tionship between the state, the market and the
family towards more welfare and social serv-
ices financed and provided by the market and
family? Or has Sweden managed to keep its
generous and universal welfare regime?
It is often argued that the first signs of impact
of neo-liberalism in Sweden could be observed
when the Social Democratic Party was in power
in the 1980s. The Minister of Finance  Kjell-
Olof Feldt  and a clique of economists around
him deregulated capital controls, gave the cen-
tral bank an unprecedented autonomy and
changed the tax system to increase work-incen-
tives. But it is hard to argue that any retrench-
ment in the welfare state was attempted. The
Swedish economy was booming after the de-
valuations around 1980. Although there were
warning signs that the tide was shifting, the
Social Democrats in the election campaign in
1988 instead promised new expansions of so-
cial policy as for example an extension of the
paid parental leave period and more places in
public childcare. This would of course raise
expenditure considerably.
However, already by 1990 the economy was
in free fall. Trying to meet this challenge, the
390
Social Democrats made some changes in wel-
fare programs, but more importantly, lost the
election of 1991. A four-party non-socialist coa-
lition led by a Prime Minister from the Moder-
ate Party (a right-wing party) came into power.
The coalition embraced ideas about welfare state
transformation, gender equality and family poli-
cies that were a somewhat peculiar mix of neo-
liberal, neo-conservative as well as more tradi-
tional social democratic values. These diverse
values reflected the ideas of the four parties in
the coalition. In the election campaign the non-
socialist parties had promised to change the
welfare state and to introduce a home care al-
lowance.
During the 1990s unemployment increased to
levels unthinkable since the 1930s, from 1,7%
in 1990 to 8,3% in 1993. GDP growth was nega-
tive in 199193, and as a result of less public
income and heavy pressure on public expendi-
ture the national budget ran into heavy deficits.
Within only four years Sweden went from hav-
ing the largest budget surplus in the OECD to
operating the largest deficit, which 1993
amounted to 14% of the GDP (Ds 2002). At
least at first glance, the possibilities for welfare
retrenchment would therefore seem to be sig-
nificant: a (partly) neo-liberal government in
favour of privatisation and restructuring of the
welfare state, heavy budget-deficits, and an
awareness of an economic crisis among the
population (and even the political opposition).
Indeed, cutbacks and reconfigurations in wel-
fare programs and services were made and some
of them were continued by the Social Demo-
crats after their return into power in 1994.
In international comparisons the Swedish
welfare state has in general been associated with
generous public spending, universalism, egali-
tarianism, limited scope for the private sector
and a broad spectrum of high quality social serv-
ices. The aim of this article is to analyse the
characteristics of Swedish welfare restructuring.
Has the Swedish welfare state lost its defining
characteristics? Has the social democratic wel-
fare model been dismantled? What does the re-
structuring implicate from a gender perspective?
The point of departure is that the social demo-
cratic welfare regime is comparatively women
friendly, or as we prefer to say gender-equality
friendly. Gender-equality friendly policies do
not support the traditional division of labour
between women and men; on the contrary they
support women as well as men to abandon their
traditional roles. Gender equality in both labour
force participation and in care work is encour-
aged. In addition gender-equality friendly poli-
cies do not discriminate against single parents
or same sex couples (Sörenson/Bergqvist 2002).
According to comparative studies of welfare
states Sweden has come a rather long way to-
wards institutionalising a welfare state regime
that is fairly gender-equality friendly. Women
as well as men have been included as citizen
workers in all the main social insurance systems
and the provision of public childcare has been a
pre-condition for the possibility to reconcile
family and work (Hernes 1987; Sainsbury 1999;
Huber/Stephens 2001).
In this article we will first give a general pic-
ture of the development of the main social in-
surance programs, then we will turn to the
changes in social services and do an in-depth
analysis of the childcare sector.
2.Measuring Welfare State Retrenchment
and Regime Change
The question whether the Swedish welfare
state can still be described as a social democratic
welfare state or not is in fact, at least partly, the
same question as asking whether the Swedish
welfare state has been dismantled. As Paul
Pierson we define retrenchment as something
more than cuts, or merely quantitative change.
Retrenchment signifies a qualitative change of
the welfare state. We thus turn our attention to
reforms that would indicate structural changes
of the welfare state. Such reforms would con-
tain significant increases in reliance on means-
tested benefits, radical reductions of benefits
and/or tightening of eligibility rules and priva-
tisation of major social services (Esping-
Andersen 1990, 54, 73; Pierson 1996, 157).
How then do we judge whether changes are
marginal or radical? Pierson does not offer a
very systematic approach in this respect (cf.
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Alber 1996; Clayton/Pontusson 1998; Lindbom
2001). This is not altogether surprising; it is hard
to theoretically define the point where quantita-
tive change becomes qualitative. However,
Esping-Andersens welfare regimes (1990) can
serve as a starting point for this purpose. Re-
forms of Swedish welfare programs are consid-
ered to be retrenchment when program expendi-
ture is not only cut marginally, but when reforms
make the welfare state lose its, in international
comparison, characteristic attributes.
Esping-Andersens book The Three Worlds of
Welfare Capitalism (1990) was without doubt
the most referred to and praised book within
welfare research during the last decades. We will
use his widely known and accepted typology
for a new purpose: measuring change over time.
Although the author identified three welfare
regimes, the first question whether social insur-
ance has been retrenched or restructured puts
the focus on social democratic and liberal re-
gimes. The basic difference between them is that
while the liberal regime provides for the poor
alone according to a principle of need and lets
the middle class turn to private insurance
schemes, the social democratic regime serves
all citizens according to more generous, middle
class, standards.
Esping-Andersen measures welfare regimes
on two different dimensions: decommodification
and stratification. The gist of decommo-
dification is the emancipation of workers from
market dependency, e.g. by an unemployment
benefit providing citizens with an adequate al-
ternative source of income (Esping-Andersen
1990, 47). We will analyse its main ingredient:
replacement rates (cf. van Kersbergen 1995).
The Swedish values of today will be compared
with the values of Esping-Andersens 18 coun-
tries of 1980. Are Swedish replacement rates of
today still among the highest in such a compari-
son or rather similar to the values of the lib-
eral welfare states of 1980?
Secondly, we address the question if the
Swedish welfare state stratifies in a liberal or
a social democratic way today. Esping-
Andersen not only sees the welfare state as a
correction to market inequalities. It is in its own
right a system of stratification, an active force
in the ordering of social relations. The social
democratic or universal welfare state has cre-
ated a broad pro-welfare coalition between
workers and farmers/the middle class, integrat-
ing them into the Peoples Home (Esping-
Andersen 1990, 23, 67ff.). The liberal welfare
state on the other hand alienates the middle class
from the welfare state. Liberalisation will be
measured in three ways, all of them correspond-
ing closely to Esping-Andersens operationali-
sation. How much is spent on means-tested ben-
efits relative to other social expenditure? This
measure is then compared to liberal welfare
states of 1980. The same procedure is followed
with respect to the two other indicators of liber-
alism: private pensions relative to total pensions
and private health expenditure relative to total
health expenditure.
If Sweden no longer scores above average on
Esping-Andersens indicators of liberalism or
if replacement rates are not well above the level
of the liberal welfare states of 1980 or the
score on universalism is no longer well above
the average, the conclusion will be that it is jus-
tified to speak in terms of welfare state retrench-
ment.
We will go beyond Esping-Andersens ap-
proach in two points. First, his way of measur-
ing universality needs to be supplemented since
it produces a paradox. As we will show later,
the universality of the Swedish welfare state
increases according to one indicator and de-
creases according to another one. If cuts of the
replacement rates of social insurance schemes
have made a large number of citizens depend-
ent on social assistance, this equals retrench-
ment (Pierson 1996; Clayton/Pontusson 1998,
77). Secondly, Esping-Andersens analysis of
1990 was only concerned with social transfers,
while the most characteristic feature of the
Swedish welfare state is that it provides social
services on a quite different scale from all coun-
tries outside Scandinavia (Esping-Andersen
1999). Feminist research has pointed out that
the state/family axis measures variations in wel-
fare states concerning whether they institution-
alised forms of support for families or relied
upon the family as form of welfare, or expected
the market to provide benefits and services for
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families. In the early 1980s the Swedish wel-
fare state had established a dual-income norm,
generous parental leave legislation and devel-
oped a public childcare system, which allowed
mothers as well as fathers to combine family
and work (Leira 1992; Bergqvist 1999;
Sainsbury 1999). A structural change in this case
would for example be a privatisation of childcare
services.
3. Retrenchment within Social Insurance?
Estimations are made for 2002 for most indi-
cators, but regarding pensions the values pre-
sented are from 1998. That year, the Swedish
parliament decided to make significant changes
in the pension system and the complexity of
those changes makes it necessary to deal with
them separately at the end of this section.
3.1. Stratification
The indicators of whether welfare state libera-
lism has increased or not are presented in table 1.
For the social assistance quota we can ob-
serve a major change in the value for Sweden:
from 1,1% to 2,2%. However, this is still below
the average value of Esping-Andersens data for
the 18 countries in 1980. Data suggest a rela-
tive expansion of private pensions compared to
public pensions. The value has more than dou-
bled since 1980, but this still leaves the Swed-
ish value in 1998 lower than the international
average for 1980.1  Concerning private health
care there has also been a clear trend towards
liberalisation, but the trend was however not
strong enough to change the fact that Swedish
health care still is publicly produced to a far
larger degree than in other countries.
Summing up, on all three indicators there is a
clear trend towards liberalisation. However,
when judging whether the Swedish welfare state
has lost its defining attributes we need to take
the starting point into consideration. Then we
notice that despite considerable increases, the
Swedish values are still well below the aver-
ages of the 18 countries of 1980 for all three
indicators. The significant decline of the social
assistance quota from 1998 (3,6%) to 2002
(2,2%) moreover suggests that the Swedish
welfare state has gained increased strength as
the immediate economic crisis of the 1990s dis-
appeared (Lindbom 2001). The results therefore
clearly indicate that Sweden has not gained the
attributes of a liberal welfare state.
3.2. Replacement Rates
Replacement rates for sickness and unemploy-
ment benefits refer to the first 26 weeks for an
average industrial worker after waiting days.
Pension replacement rates refer to the rates that
such workers receive when they retire with 35
years of work experience.
For pensions nothing much has happened if
one compares 1980 and 1998 (72% on both
occasions). For the sickness cash benefit there
has been a reduction of the replacement rate
from 90% in 1980 to 79% in 2002. For the un-
Table 1: Stratification  Indicators on welfare state liberalism
Means-tested poor relief Private pensions Private health spending
(as % of total public (as % of total) (as % of total)
social expenditure)
Sweden 1980 1,1 15,5 7
18 country mean 1980 5,9 13,0 22
Standard deviation 1980 5,1 10,0 14
Sweden 1998/2002 (2002) 2,2 (1998) 12,1 (2002) 14,8
Sources: Lindbom 2001; Socialbidrag 2002; Socialförsäkringsboken 2002, 92; OECD Health Data 2003 2nd ed.
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employment benefit the replacement level has
actually become more generous: 0,78 (2002)
compared to only 0,64 (1980). On average, re-
cent replacement rates are more generous than
they were in 1980, but there is variation between
different programs.
All the Swedish net replacement rates are
higher than the average 18 countries value for
1980: for pensions 0,72 compared to 0,54, for
sickness benefits 0,79 compared to 0,70 and for
the unemployment benefit 0,78 compared to
0,63. Moreover, the recent trend is that the re-
placement rate of the unemployment benefit has
been raised significantly from 0,71 (1998) to
0,78 (2002) (Lindbom 2001, 177). Summing up,
neither a comparison over time in Sweden nor a
comparison with other countries suggests that
the Swedish welfare state has lost its generos-
ity, i.e. that the labour force has been recom-
modified.
3.3. Universalism
The indicator of universalism measures who
is formally entitled to social insurance. The peo-
ples pension still is universal and the sickness
cash benefit is as universal now as it was in 1980.
Universality in the case of unemployment ben-
efits refers to the number of members of volun-
tary unemployment schemes relative to the size
of the labour force. This value has increased over
time. In 1980 74% of the labour force were
members while 86% were in 20022. The Swed-
ish welfare state therefore is more universal to-
day than it was at the end of the golden age.
As we saw above however, costs for social
assistance have been rising more than costs for
social transfers, which indicates less uni-
versalism. Although these indicators are two
sides of the same coin, they do not correlate.
How can this be explained? Clayton and
Pontusson (1998, 76f.) rightly point out that only
three of the major Swedish social programs are
truly universal: child allowances, health care and
the peoples pension. Most of the big social se-
curity programs provide benefits to former par-
ticipants of the labour market. Therefore it can
be expected that the rise of Swedish unemploy-
ment has affected the number of people having
access to social insurance. But the authors (Clay-
ton/Pontusson 1998, 77; own emphasis) go fur-
ther than this, they also assert that many of the
people that are no longer employed have ended
up on some form of means-tested social assist-
ance, but lack a reference for this claim.
There is however no data available to sup-
port the idea that formerly employed persons 
who thereby have access to unemployment ben-
efits  now massively require social assistance.
A typical unemployed industrial worker living
alone still enjoys a standard well above the so-
cial assistance norm (SOU 1999, 46 f.). Moreo-
ver, there has been no increase in the number
of unemployed whose right to payments from
the unemployment insurance funds has ceased
since there is a de facto guarantee against the
termination of unemployment benefit of the
long-term unemployed. People threatened by
termination of their unemployment benefit are
given priority in job-creation and training
schemes that re-qualify them for unemployment
benefit (Salonen 1993, 206; Ståhlberg 1997,
57). Therefore we argue that retrenchment is
not a valid description of the cuts in benefit lev-
els of unemployment and sickness insurance.
The rise of costs for social assistance can
largely be explained by a growing amount of
unemployed people without former participa-
tion in the Swedish labour market, in particular
young people and immigrants (Salonen 1993,
210; Socialbidrag 1998).
Table 2: Swedish net replacement rates
Pensions Unemployment Sickness
1980 0,72 0,64 0,90
recent 0,72 (1998) 0,78 (2002) 0,79 (2002)
Source: Lindbom 2001; own calculations.
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But what is the situation of the target group,
i.e. the unemployed? On the one hand the per-
centage of unemployed getting unemployment
benefits was higher 1998 (80%) than in 1980
(62%). On the other hand in absolute numbers
unemployed lacking adequate economic cover
more than doubled between 1989 and 1995.
Since then however the numbers have declined
again (Lindbom 2001, 182).
Although some tendencies point to certain
groups falling through the safety net of the so-
cial insurances, this should not be interpreted
as a convergence of the Swedish welfare state
towards Esping-Andersens conservative wel-
fare regime. The Swedish welfare state has never
been universal in a strict sense. In fact there has
been an inconsistency between the political dis-
course of the welfare state and the political pro-
grams. Programs like unemployment benefits,
sickness cash benefits and the supplementary
pension (ATP) all required previous participa-
tion in the labour market. The high universal-
ity of the Swedish welfare state was to some
degree a result of the high level of womens la-
bour market participation.
When unemployment was low this contradic-
tion between discourse and actual program rules
was only latent, but with increasing unemploy-
ment it has become visible. The programs have
not been changed much, but the context has
changed, leaving groups like immigrants and
young adults without protection from the uni-
versal schemes.
Although the used indicators exaggerate the
universalism of the welfare state, this is not only
true for Sweden. The conclusion therefore must
be that that the Swedish welfare state remains
relatively universal.
3.4. Pension Reform
The analysis so far can be criticised for only
taking into consideration reforms that have al-
ready taken effect. The important pension re-
form that was decided upon in 1998 will how-
ever have its impact in the future. Due to transi-
tion rules, pensions today are still paid accord-
ing to earlier rules. The reform is highly com-
plex, but in spite of it being fairly radical we
argue that it does not fundamentally change the
Swedish welfare state. Pensions remain univer-
sal, although the basic pension in the future com-
pliments the income-related scheme rather than
the other way around as in the old system. A
funded component is introduced in the public
pension scheme, but it is compulsory and com-
plements the pay-as-you-go system, rather than
replaces it. In Esping-Andersens terms, the most
important change is that the new system in-
creases work-incentives compared to the cur-
rent system, i.e. it recommodifies labour to some
extent. All in all, the pension reform is a sig-
nificant reform, but it does not change the fun-
damental attributes of the Swedish welfare state
(cf. Lindbom 2001, 2001b).
4.Welfare State Restructuring and Social
Services
We now bring the social service sector into
our focus, a welfare state dimension that has re-
cently attained more and more attention. Accord-
ing to Esping-Andersen the social democratic
welfare regime became distinct only in the 1970s
when income protection was complemented with
an expansion of social services (Esping-
Andersen 1999, chapter 4; see also Anttonen/
Sipilä 1996). The question here is if Sweden still
bears the characteristics of a social democratic
welfare regime where social services have gen-
erous public spending, are of high quality, where
the scope for the private sector is limited and
services are universal and egalitarian. This will
not be evaluated in an 18 countries comparison,
since the result then would be given. In a com-
parative perspective Sweden still has highly de-
veloped social services (Anttonen/Sipilä 1996).
Nor will the comparison be done with the Swed-
ish values for 1980. The social services ex-
panded considerably in the 1980s. By making
1990 the year of comparison the test of the wel-
fare regime thesis becomes much harder.
For an in-depth analysis we will mainly fo-
cus on public childcare services. The reason to
choose this sector is that it symbolises many of
the ambitions of the Swedish welfare state to
395
promote equality between different groups in
society as well as between women and men. In
addition this is a critical case as there were sev-
eral challenges to the Swedish childcare model
during the 1990s. The new non-socialist gov-
ernment of 1991, headed by Carl Bildt (Moder-
ate Party), declared as their primary goal to im-
plement a revolution of choice in the public
service sector (Blomqvist/Rothstein 2001, 9).
For the childcare sector this meant a combina-
tion of neo-liberal and conservative ideas about
decentralisation, markets and privatisation, as
well as the introduction of a home care allow-
ance. The home care allowance  long favoured
by the Moderate, Centre (agrarian) and Chris-
tian Democratic Parties  was again touted as a
means of providing mothers with the choice to
take care of their own children at home. In this
case neo-liberalism and familialism went hand
in hand. Thus there are many reasons to expect
that childcare services have been restructured
and dismantled. We will evaluate the 1990s de-
velopment by looking at public expenditure,
universalism, quality, privatisation, and egali-
tarianism in this sector.
4.1. Public Expenditure
In Sweden public childcare has been seen as
a vehicle to promote gender equality and full
employment, as well as equality between dif-
ferent kinds of families, and equal provision of
care and education for pre-school children.
Since the 1970s the expansion of public
childcare services was in general an accepted
policy goal and has been a growing part of the
national budget. However, during the early
1990s the costs of childcare as a share of GDP
decreased, the gross costs for childcare went
down and less resources were spent per child
(see figure 1). The decrease in resources was
Figure 1: Costs of public childcare as a share of GNP, gross costs for public childcare, number of children
in public childcare and cost per child. Index 1991 = 100.
* Costs per hour (19911995) and costs per child full-time (19961998) in public childcare centre. Unfortunately,
due to changes in the statistics in 1998 it is not possible to make comparisons with the years after 1997 in the other
measurements. Until 1997 preschool covered 16 year olds, in 1998 15 year olds.
Source: Bergqvist/Nyberg 2002, 291.
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partly due to a baby-boom, which meant that
around 188,000 more children were in public
childcare in 1998 than in 1990. Another indica-
tion of fewer resources is that during this pe-
riod parental fees rose: In 1990 parents paid 10%
of the total gross costs of childcare in direct
childcare fees but by 1998 this proportion had
increased to 17% (Bergqvist/Nyberg 2002,
291f.).
The above figures seem to indicate that this is
a case of retrenchment and perhaps restructur-
ing. Yet it is too early to jump to this conclusion
as toward the end of the decade and in the early
2000s the resources used for childcare have in-
creased again.
4.2. Universalism and the Quality of Public
Childcare
The right to childcare has never been univer-
sal in the same sense as for example education.
Except for some hours of pre-school for six year
olds, the right to public childcare has in prac-
tice been restricted to children whose parents
are in paid work or to children with special
needs. Thus, labour market participation or need
have formed the basis for eligibility to publicly
financed childcare. In practice supply has never
matched demand, so even employed parents
have sometimes been unable to find the
childcare they need.
In times of cuts in public spending one might
expect a tightening of eligibility rules as one
way to save money. This, however, has not been
the route taken in Sweden. In fact more chil-
dren than ever have access to childcare institu-
tions. From 1990 to 1999 the proportion of chil-
dren between one and two increased from 44 to
60% and for three to six years old the corre-
sponding figures were from 64 to 82% (see ta-
ble 3). Childcare services mainly apply to chil-
dren from the age of around one and a half years
old; children below that age are mainly taken
care of by their mothers (usually) or fathers
(sometimes) on paid parental leave (Bergqvist/
Nyberg 2002, 293f.).
The goal of public childcare today is not only
to serve working parents but also to educate and
support the development of pre-school children.
This is, of course, not possible if eligibility is
tied to the parents status on the labour market.
Of particular concern here are the children of
unemployed parents. These children do not get
the same support and early childhood education
as those whose parents work and who therefore
are eligible for a place in public childcare.
Thus, contrary to what might have been ex-
pected in times of economic restraint, on the
aggregate level universalism has been strength-
ened. The expectation that the non-socialist gov-
ernment would promote home care allowance
at the expense of childcare services was not ful-
filled. As a matter of fact the fourth coalition
party, the small Liberal Party and in particular
the liberal Minister for Social Affairs and Gen-
der Equality, Bengt Westerberg, was the driv-
ing force behind a new Act on Childcare
strengthening the right to a place in public
childcare.
Since the Social Democrats came back into
power in September 1994 several steps towards
a more universal childcare system have been
taken. Responsibility for childcare on the na-
tional level was moved from the Ministry of
Health and Social Affairs to the Ministry of
Education and Science in July 1996, with the
aim of strengthening the pedagogical profile of
childcare. This inaugurated a process of inte-
grating childcare and school into the same leg-
islation. Legislation for the whole childcare sec-
tor has been brought into the School Act, and
Table 3: Children enrolled in publicly subsidized
day care centres, pre-schools and family
day care units 1990  1997, % of the
population by age
12 years old 36 years old
1990 44 64
1992 46 65
1994 48 70
1996 57 76
1997 59 78
1999 60 82
Source: Bergqvist/Nyberg 2002, 293.
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the National Agency for Education has the su-
pervisory responsibility.
In addition, the social democratic government
has moved childcare further in the direction of
universalism. In November 2000 the Swedish
parliament decided to implement the right to
childcare for the children of the unemployed, a
universal and free pre-school for all four and
five year olds and the imposition of a maximum
parental fee by the national government. The
Social Democratic Party got support from the
Left Party and the Green Party for these reforms.
The four bourgeois parties in opposition did not
support the reforms and instead suggested a
lump sum (childcare account) to all parents with
pre-school children and the right to tax deduc-
tions of childcare costs; measures that would
be more in line with a liberal regime.
Was quality of childcare services retained?
There is no straightforward way to measure
quality in childcare, but changes in child/staff
ratios and group size might provide a rough in-
dication. Since 1990 the number of children per
staff rose rapidly. In 1990 the average number
of children per annual worker in childcare cen-
tres was close to four and by 1999 the number
was around five. Also the group size changed.
In 1990 the average group size was around 14
children but by 1998 it was around 16 children.
More children per group and per adult can be
interpreted as a deterioration of the quality in
childcare, but it is also possible that the munici-
palities are producing as high quality childcare
with fewer resources due to better educated staff,
for instance. There are no systematic studies
about how quality is affected by changes in re-
sources over time. It is thus hard to give a well-
qualified answer to the question of qualitative
changes in Swedish public childcare over the
last decade (Bergqvist/Nyberg 2002, 292ff.).
4.3. Privatisation
During the last decades of the twentieth cen-
tury, a political trend towards privatisation has
swept over the world. This has not left Sweden
untouched, but private solutions can be of dif-
ferent kinds. Childcare can be purchased from
profit-making enterprises or non-profit organi-
sations, or the family can provide it. The impli-
cations of privatisation will be different depend-
ing on whether privatisation means expanding
the role of commercial enterprises, non-profit
organisations and/or the family. During the
1990s, the non-socialist government introduced
a home care allowance as a way of trying to
privatise to the family. On their return to office,
the Social Democrats abolished this care allow-
ance.
Privatisation to for-profit or non-profit organi-
sations was, however, more successful. Such
privatisation can be divided into three aspects:
provision, financing and regulation. Swedish
childcare today is, even when it is private,
publicly regulated and financed. In the 1980s,
non-municipal childcare centres became eligi-
ble for public subsidies, as long as they met cer-
tain requirements. The centre had to be run by a
non-profit organisation, such as parents coop-
eratives, or offer a special form of pedagogy or
meet other similar requirements. In 1991, when
the bourgeois parties were in power, the law was
changed to include childcare centres run by per-
sonnel cooperatives, the Swedish church, and
for-profit organisations. The proportion of chil-
dren in private non-profit and commercial
childcare centres rose from 5% in 1990 to 15%
in 1999.
The ideological difference between Social
Democrats and the bourgeois parties has not
concerned childcare centres run by non-profit
organisations such as parental cooperatives, but
for-profit, company-run childcare centres. The
bourgeois parties opened the way for public
subsidies to for-profit childcare centres at the
beginning of the 1990s. The Social Democrats
did not reverse this decision when they came
back into power. In 1998 commercial childcare
accounted for around a quarter of the privately
run childcare centres.
The general impression is that the private sec-
tor in childcare has grown, but this can be con-
tested. Today the proportion of children in pri-
vate childcare of all children in childcare is
smaller (16%) than in the 1980s (40%). This is
explained by the fact that a higher share of all
pre-school children today has access to differ-
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ent kinds of regulated pre-school activities. In
other words, the big difference between the
1980s and today is that the need for unregulated
childcare, organised and financed privately by
the parents, has been crowded out by publicly
financed childcare. The municipalities still run
the great majority of childcare at the same time
as the way has been opened for public subsi-
dies to regulated non-profit and for-profit
childcare (Bergqvist/Nyberg 2002, 296f.).
4.4. Egalitarianism
Here we will look at how the increase in the
number of places in publicly financed and regu-
lated childcare has affected the distribution of
public childcare among different groups in so-
ciety. Egalitarianism is of course about equal
rights and benefits, but in a social democratic
welfare state it is also about the active promo-
tion of well-being and life chances for both rich
and poor, women and men and about redistri-
bution. Has the recent development of childcare
services upheld the ideals of egalitarianism?
Traditionally children of single mothers have
been a target group of Swedish childcare
policies. Childcare in contrast to the pedagogi-
cal pre-schools has originally been seen as a
way to alleviate poverty by making it possible
for poor (often single) mothers to work for pay
and to be self-sufficient. In the 1960s almost
half of the children in day care centres were
children of single mothers. From the 1970s
through the 1990s, the proportion started to
decrease and in 1994 only 16% of the children
in public childcare were children of single
mothers. This reflects the substantial increase
in the number of children of cohabiting/mar-
ried mothers in public childcare rather than a
decline in access for single parents. In fact,
access has improved for the children of single
parents too. In 1996, 83% of cohabiting, em-
ployed parents had their children in public
childcare as compared to 91% of single par-
ents (Bergqvist/Nyberg 2002, 298).
Source: Bergqvist/Nyberg 2002, 298.
Figure 2: Proportion of children 26 years of age in public childcare
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Another aspect of egalitarianism is class. As
we have seen full-time childcare was clearly
linked to poverty relief and originally childcare
centres did not enjoy a good reputation as long
as their main role was to mind the children while
their mothers, of necessity, worked. However,
their role expanded, the quality in the centres
increased and middle-class parents became more
interested. The higher quality and the growing
number of working middle-class women led to
a rapid increase in the share of middle-class
children and a concomitant decrease in the share
of working class children amongst the children
in public childcare in the 1960s and 1970s. By
the beginning of the 1980s, the share of chil-
dren of parents organised by unions belonging
to the white-collar organisations TCO (Swed-
ish Confederation of Professional Employees)
and SACO (Swedish Confederation of Profes-
sional Associations) was higher than the share
of children of parents belonging to the blue-col-
lar organisation LO (Swedish Trade Union Fed-
eration).3
For the social democratic government it was
an embarrassment that children of high-income
parents were the main beneficiaries of the pub-
lic childcare system. Contrary to the original
intention of Social Democrats and their ally LO,
public childcare was contributing to enhanc-
ing the differences between parents and chil-
dren from different classes. As we can see in
Figure 2, lately the proportion of LO-children
with access to public childcare has increased
faster than the other two categories. By 1994/
5, the distance between the groups had appre-
ciably diminished.
Another aspect of equality is how the unem-
ployed and immigrants manage in a system,
which to a high degree has been based on em-
ployment. In many municipalities children lost
their right to a childcare place when any of the
parents became unemployed. This fact has
struck immigrants quite hard, as they have been
over-represented among the unemployed. To
deal with this problem the social democratic
government introduced a right for the children
of unemployed parents to at least three hours
per day or 15 hours per week of preschool in
2001.
5. Concluding Remarks
Once and again the Swedish model of the
welfare state is declared dead. Our analysis how-
ever suggests that there are no strong indica-
tions that the Swedish version of the social
democratic welfare state regime has been com-
pletely transformed. Initially we argued that
welfare state retrenchment and regime change
is something more than cuts and that a case of
severe retrenchment would contain significant
increases in reliance on means-tested benefits,
radical reductions of benefits and/or tightening
of eligibility rules and privatisation of major
social services. We have found that it would be
too far-fetched to argue that the Swedish wel-
fare state has lost its traditional characteristics.
On the contrary we show that some features 
as for instance universalism  have in fact been
strengthened in some of the core programs of
social insurance and in the childcare sector.
Swedish social insurance programs are mainly
tied to labour market affiliation and since the
1980s it has become clear that they are more
universal due to womens increased time in paid
work. However, the unemployment crisis dur-
ing the 1990s left several vulnerable groups of
women, immigrants and young people outside
the system. Today Sweden is not the same Swe-
den as it may have been 15 to 25 years ago, and
many factors external to the welfare state sys-
tem in itself as well as the context have changed.
Thus economic development, demographic
trends, and fluctuations in employment and un-
employment among women and men have prob-
ably been subject of more drastic changes than
welfare state programs and services in them-
selves. In addition, the neo-liberal trend in the
international as well as the internal political are-
nas has posed a threat to the continuation of tra-
ditional social democratic politics. These exter-
nal factors and the political challenges have of
course affected the functioning of the welfare
state, but we claim that this has rather led to a
policy of adaptation and resilience than to se-
vere retrenchment of social insurance programs.
Also with respect to social services change
can be observed and to some extent a process
of restructuring  in the sense of deregulation
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and decentralisation  has taken place. Today,
market solutions are focused on more strongly
than before, and we find a broader scope of for-
profit organisations. However, no privatisation
towards family-based childcare took place. On
the contrary, in 1995 the new social democratic
government immediately abolished the home
care allowance introduced in 1994 during the
last year of the bourgeois government coalition.
In fact the bourgeois parties as well as the So-
cial Democrats improved the right to childcare
and pre-school activities during the 1990s, pro-
moted reforms such as the daddy-months and
in that respect the threat to the gender-equality
friendly welfare state has not come true.
To conclude, the changes of the Swedish wel-
fare state during the 1990s were incremental,
rather than fundamental. Cuts have been made,
but they do not sum up to a radical restructur-
ing of the welfare state. Moreover, there is still
room for public policy divergence. Even for a
small open economy with the highest budget
deficit in the OECD in the early 1990s it has
been possible to regain control over the national
budget without dismantling the welfare state.
NOTES
1 It is hard to find good data on private pensions. Our
data probably overestimates the increase (cf.
Lindbom 2001).
2 Personal Communication National Insurance Board
(RFV), Statistics Sweden (SCB), Labour Market
Surveys (AKU).
3 The categorisation is based on the union the inter-
viewed parent belonged to. It should be pointed out
that a very high proportion of the Swedish employ-
ees are members of a union.
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